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THE INCREMENTAL RETRIBUTIVE IMPACT OF A DEATH
SENTENCE OVER LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE
Michael L. Radelet*
ABSTRACT
In this paper, I take a closer look at retribution, which is the primary justification
for the death penalty today in the United States and the main component of the
additional punishment imposed by the death penalty over and above life imprison-
ment without parole (LWOP). While all criminal punishments, to varying degrees,
punish both the inmate and his or her family, I argue that the death penalty’s
added punishment over LWOP often punishes the family just as much as the in-
mate, and after the execution the full brunt of the punishment falls on the family.
This added impact disproportionately punishes women and children. My data
come from work with scores of death row inmates and their families over the past
thirty-five years, including sharing “last visits” with approximately fifty of the in-
mates.1 The family members have not been convicted of any capital offense, so in
this sense the death penalty punishes the innocent just as much as it punishes the
guilty.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past four decades, there have been dramatic changes in
how the death penalty in the United States is justified in public dis-
course. Religious justifications,2 incapacitation of the prisoner,3 cost
* Professor of Sociology and Faculty Associate, Institute of Behavioral Science,
University of Colorado, Boulder. I would like to thank Lisa Radelet and Elizabeth Zitrin for
their insightful comments on previous drafts of this paper.
1. I visited the inmates at the request of their defense attorneys, and as such, all con-
ventional norms governing attorney-client interactions, such as confidentiality, apply to my
work. (Where it is possible to make assertions based on my general observations resulting
from my years of experience working with death row inmates, I have indicated this in the text
below.)
2. For information on religious perspectives on the death penalty, see Religion and the
Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php%3
Fdid%3D2249 (last visited Apr. 8, 2016).
3. “Incapacitation” refers to the control of convicted offenders so they cannot commit
future crimes. When one claims that we must execute offenders to prevent them from killing
again, that person is invoking the incapacitation argument. See generally Jack P. Gibbs, Prevent-
ative Effects of Capital Punishment Other than Deterrence, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 103,
106–08 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 3rd ed. 1982). In the forty years since Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976), constituting the “modern era” of the death penalty, all states that use the
death penalty have also adopted statutes that allow for sentences of life imprisonment with-
out parole, thereby effectively eliminating the argument that we need the death penalty to
protect our communities from repeat criminality. See Year that States Adopted Life without Parole
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savings,4 and deterrence have fallen in importance in pro-death
penalty arguments, and increasingly the principal, if not the sole,
argument in favor of the death penalty is retribution or “just des-
serts.”5 Proponents of the death penalty, however, overlook that a
death row inmate’s innocent family and friends are the ones who
bear the brunt of the death penalty’s retributive impact. In this Arti-
cle, I compare the retributive effects of the death penalty with the
retributive effects of life imprisonment without parole (LWOP) and
argue that the incremental (added) retributive effects of the death
penalty often punish a greater number of innocent people than life
imprisonment. Death penalty proponents who base their support
on retribution need to recognize that retribution affects both the
guilty and the innocent.
Retribution is not a manifest goal of most criminal penalties, al-
though it is still present in varying intensity as an unintended side
effect. In my experience, the more severe the punishment, the
more its justification rests on retributive principles.6 No criminal
punishment, however, is more rooted in retributive ideology than
the death penalty. This Article discusses the retributive effects of
life imprisonment without parole (LWOP) and compares them to
the retributive effects of executions, focusing on the incremental
(or added) retributive effects that the death penalty brings to the
table.
My observations and conclusions rest primarily on data from my
own experiences. Over the past thirty-five years I have met, worked
with, and corresponded with hundreds of death row inmates, po-
tential death row inmates, and former death row inmates from
across the United States. In approximately fifty Florida cases, I went
through “last visits” with the inmate, his family, one or two of the
inmate’s friends, his spiritual advisor, and his legal team, on the
eves of the executions.7 In approximately ten of these cases, family
(LWOP) Sentencing, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/year-
states-adopted-life-without-parole-lwop-sentencing (last visited Apr. 8, 2016).
4. With many studies indicating that there is no longer any empirical support for the
assertion that executions are less expensive than long-term imprisonment, justifications
based on relative expense have fallen away over the past two decades. For information on the
financial costs of the death penalty, see Costs of the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO.
CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/costs-death-penalty (last visited Apr. 8, 2016).
5. By “retribution” I mean a goal of punishment that involves making the guilty pris-
oner suffer for the sake of suffering. For definitions and a general discussion of retribution,
see, for example, Hugo Adam Bedau, Retribution and the Theory of Punishment, 75 J. PHIL. 601
(1978).
6. For a discussion of the death penalty’s retributive justifications, see, for example,
JAMES R. ACKER, QUESTIONING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 1–29 (2014).
7. As of April 1, 2015, there were 3,002 prisoners on American death rows, 98 percent
of whom are male. DEBORAH FINS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROJECT OF THE NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE
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members of the condemned inmate stayed at my home, thirty-five
miles from the site of executions, Florida State Prison in Starke, in
the days preceding the execution. I have worked with approxi-
mately ten suspects facing death penalty trials, primarily in Florida
and Colorado, in which my role was to urge the defendant to seek
or accept a plea bargain and sentence of life imprisonment rather
than risk a death sentence. I have worked at length with several
men already on death row who were considering dropping their
appeals and volunteering for execution, and for the past thirty-five
years I have exchanged regular letters with numerous inmates living
under a death sentence or whose death sentences were commuted
to prison terms by appellate courts.
Part I of this Article explains how, over the past forty years, pro-
death penalty arguments in the United States have become increas-
ingly based on a general theory of retribution. In Part II, I compare
the retributive effects of the death penalty to the retributive effects
of LWOP, arguing that the incremental retributive effects of the
death penalty often punish a greater number of innocent people,
who feel the effects more intensely, and for a longer period of time,
than the retributive impacts of life imprisonment. Part III discusses
how the retributive impact of the death penalty on the families of
death row inmates, and on the inmates’ friends, spiritual advisor,
attorneys, and others close to him, undermines the principle that
the criminal justice system punishes only the guilty and never the
innocent. The death penalty affects everyone who knows, cares for,
or works with the death row inmate. In Part IV, I conclude that the
retributive effects of the death penalty affect larger and larger con-
centric circles of loved ones centered around the inmate. This not
only ultimately takes the life of the offender, but also negatively
impacts or even permanently damages the lives of many more peo-
ple.8 To supporters of the death penalty, the retributive power of
the punishment on these innocent victims can only be viewed as
“collateral damage.” Because these secondarily punished people are
not only innocent but usually impoverished, stigmatized, and pow-
erless, the death penalty causes suffering that is usually hidden and
not publicized.
AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., DEATH ROW U.S.A. 1 (Spring 2015), http://www.naacpldf.org/
files/publications/DRUSA_Spring_2015.pdf. Given this gender maldistribution, I will use
masculine pronouns in this essay to refer to death row inmates.
8. See generally, ROBERT M. BOHM, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT’S COLLATERAL DAMAGE (2013).
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I. THE GROWTH OF RETRIBUTION AS THE PRIMARY (OR SOLE)
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE DEATH PENALTY
In June 1972, the Supreme Court, in effect, abolished all existing
death penalty statutes in the U.S.,9 forcing the states and the federal
government to go back to their legislative drawing boards to write
new death penalty laws. Florida led this effort and enacted the first
“post-Furman” death penalty law in late 1972.10 In 1976, the Su-
preme Court upheld three of the new state statutes,11 and in
January 1977, Utah put to death the first inmate in the so-called
“modern” era of the death penalty, Gary Gilmore, by firing squad.12
Since that time, justifications for the death penalty have changed
considerably. In a crude poll administered in 1991, Gallup found
that fifty percent of the death penalty supporters in the sample jus-
tified their position with “An eye for an eye, They took a life, Fits
the crime.”13 Nineteen percent of advocates cited incapacitation,
“They will repeat crime/Keep them from repeating it,” as justifica-
tion for their position.14 Deterrence and “Save taxpayers money”
were each given as death penalty justifications by thirteen percent.15
Though not explicitly measured in the poll, at the time, significant
numbers of death penalty supporters based their position on bibli-
cal or religious sources, particularly with Old Testament principles
such as “lex talionis” or “eye for an eye.”16
Many of those arguments have not stood up well over the past
thirty years. Theological discussions, changes in sentencing laws,
and empirical research have all played a role in undermining many
of the most common death penalty arguments from the 1970s and
9. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). For a discussion of the
aftermath of Furman, see, for example, Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Judicial Develop-
ments in Capital Punishment Law, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT:
REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 77 (James
R. Acker et al. eds., 3rd ed. 2014).
10. Charles W. Ehrhardt & L. Harold Levinson, Florida’s Legislative Response to Furman:
An Exercise in Futility? 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 10, 10 (1973).
11. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 US 153 (1976).
12. For an overview of the life and death of Gilmore, see NORMAN MAILER, THE EXECU-
TIONER’S SONG (1979).
13. Art Swift, Americans: “Eye for an Eye” Top Reason for Death Penalty, GALLUP: SOCIAL IS-
SUES (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/178799/americans-eye-eye-top-reason-
death-penalty.aspx. Multiple responses were permitted to this question.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. For example, in 1985, thirty percent of those who favored the death penalty in a
Gallup Poll justified their position with “Revenge: an ‘eye for an eye.’” THE GALLUP POLL,
GALLUP REPORT 232 & 233, 3 (Jan./Feb. 1985).
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1980s. Religious justifications provide an example.17 In the early
1980s, public debates on the death penalty often found ministers
(usually from more fundamentalist denominations) supporting its
use, and it was not at all uncommon for both clergy and members
of the public to cite scriptures that seemingly justified the punish-
ment.18 By 1991, the late Father Robert Drinan, a Jesuit priest and
former member of Congress from Massachusetts, was able to claim
that “[t]he amazing convergence of opinion on the death penalty
among America’s religious organizations is probably stronger,
deeper, and broader than the consensus on any other topic in the
religious community in America.”19 Today, the leadership of almost
all major religions in the United States stands opposed to the death
penalty, with more of the exceptions silent on the issue rather than
explicitly in favor of executions.20
Because of changes in sentencing laws over the past thirty years,
today anyone who is convicted of a capital offense and not sen-
tenced to death will nonetheless die in prison with an LWOP
sentence. This substantially undermines the incapacitation argu-
ment. Thirty years ago, the usual sentence for such offenders was a
relatively lenient dozen years.21 Now, at the end of 2015, all thirty-
one states that authorize the imposition of death sentences also au-
thorize sentences of LWOP, as do eighteen of the nineteen non-
death penalty states.22 These statutory changes have undermined
the incapacitation justification for the death penalty: the argument
that convicted murderers will be free after relatively short prison
sentences and will thereby become threats to community safety is
untenable.
17. See, e.g., JAMES J. MEGIVERN, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN HISTORICAL AND THEOLOGICAL
SURVEY 337, 373, 380 (1997).
18. For examples of the use of scriptures and other religious sources as justifications for
the death penalty, see E.L. (Stacey) Hebden Taylor, Retribution, Responsibility and Freedom: The
Fallacy of Modern Criminal Law from a Biblical-Christian Perspective, 44 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51
(1981); see also Jacob J. Vellenga, Christianity and the Death Penalty, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN
AMERICA 123, 123–30 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., Aldine Publishing Company 1964).
19. ROBERT R. DRINAN, THE FRACTURED DREAM: AMERICA’S DECISIVE MORAL CHOICES 107
(1991).
20. See Official Religious Statements on the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php%3Fdid%3D2249#state (last visited Apr. 8,
2016).
21. “In California, prior to 1985 and changes in sentencing laws and the rise of a puni-
tive national movement, persons sentenced for first degree murder served an average of 12
years.” JOHN IRWIN, LIFERS: SEEKING REDEMPTION IN PRISON 7 (2009).
22. See Ashley Nellis, Throwing Away the Key: The Expansion of Life without Parole Sentences in
the United States, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 27, 28 (2010–2011). The exception is Alaska. See Life
without Parole, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/life-without-
parole (last visited on Apr. 8, 2016).
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A third pro-death penalty argument from the 1970s and 1980s
was that it allegedly cost less money than long imprisonment,23 but
over the past three decades the cost issue has changed from a pro-
death penalty argument to a strong anti-death penalty one. Virtu-
ally all contemporary studies on the death penalty, whether
completed by legislative bodies, state supreme courts, journalists or
academics, have found that the costs of the death penalty far ex-
ceed the costs of LWOP.24 To be sure, some Americans still ask why
their tax money is used to support the expenses of keeping murder-
ers alive. These questions become increasingly rare when people
inform themselves (even casually) about the cost data. The enor-
mous costs involved in today’s death penalty cases also raise issues
about whether the funds used to seek executions can be more effec-
tively spent to achieve some of the goals that the death penalty
allegedly seeks, such as providing help for families of homicide vic-
tims or implementing more effective ways to reduce rates of
criminal violence.
Finally, dozens of empirical research studies over the past thirty
years focus on general deterrence: whether the homicide rate de-
clines with increases in death sentences and/or executions.25 Most,
although not all, of these studies have found that the death penalty
and homicide rates are basically uncorrelated.26 Unfortunately, the
data and statistical manipulations required to address the question
are exceedingly complex,27 leaving well-intentioned advocates on
both sides of the issue free to find studies that support their points
of view regardless of whether they have any understanding of the
statistical methods or limitations of the data used by the researcher.
The opinions of criminology experts can resolve this debate.
Surveys conducted in the mid-1990s and a dozen years later found
that more than ninety percent of the nation’s leading criminolo-
gists have concluded that, based on their reading of the extant
research, the death penalty fails to deter homicides any more than
23. In the 1985 Gallup Poll, eleven percent of those who supported the death penalty
justified their position by saying it was “costly to keep them in prison.”  THE GALLUP POLL,
supra note 16, at 3.
24. For a review of recent studies, see DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, supra note 4; see
generally Richard C. Dieter, The Issue of Costs in the Death Penalty Debate, in AMERICA’S EXPERI-
MENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 9.
25. See generally Ruth D. Peterson & William C. Bailey, Is Capital Punishment an Effective
Deterrent for Murder? An Examination of Social Science Research, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 9; Robert Apel et al., Is Capital Punishment an Effective Deter-
rent for Murder? An Updated Review of Research and Theory, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 9.
26. See generally Peterson & Bailey, supra note 25; Apel et al., supra note 25.
27. See generally Peterson & Bailey, supra note 25; Apel et al., supra note 25.
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long imprisonment does.28 The latest (and perhaps last) word on
the issue came in 2012, when a seminal comprehensive report on
the deterrent effect of the death penalty was released by the Na-
tional Research Council.29 The Study Panel, composed of some of
the most respected criminologists in the United States, found that
the research “is not informative about whether capital punishment
decreases, increases, or has no effect on homicide rates.”30 This is
not to claim that no one today argues that we need more execu-
tions in order to reduce the homicide rate, but it does indicate that
those who make such arguments base their opinions on discredited
studies.
In place of the above arguments, advocates for the death penalty
are arguing today, more than ever, that executions should be justi-
fied on retributive grounds.31 By “retribution,” I mean that
offenders convicted of the most heinous crimes, because of the
enormous suffering that they have caused to the victim, the victim’s
family, and the larger community, should suffer in return, and a life
sentence is not sufficient to adequately punish those who commit
the worst murders. According to the late British legal philosopher
H.L.A. Hart, a retributive theory of punishment contains three ele-
ments: 1) a person may be punished if and only if he has voluntarily
done something wrong; 2) the punishment must match, or be
equivalent to, the wickedness of the offense; and 3) the justification
for punishing persons is that the return of suffering for suffering
for moral evil voluntarily done is itself just or morally good.32 Retri-
bution is a justification based on “just desserts,” or the idea that
offenders need to be punished simply because “they deserve it.”33
As George Braucher often said while prosecuting the gunman who
killed twelve people in a movie theater in Aurora, Colorado in
2012, “For James Eagan Holmes, justice is death.”34
28. See Michael L. Radelet & Traci L. Lacock, Do Executions Lower Homicide Rates?: The
Views of Leading Criminologists, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 507 (2009); see also Michael
L. Radelet & Ronald L. Akers, Deterrence and the Death Penalty: The Views of the Experts, 87 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 8–9, 14 (1996).
29. DANIEL S. NAGIN & JOHN V. PEPPER, DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 2 (2012).
30. Id. For a comprehensive review of these studies, see Apel et al., supra note 25.
31. Michael L. Radelet & Marian J. Borg, The Changing Nature of Death Penalty Debates, 26
ANN. REVIEWS OF SOC. 43, 52–54 (2000).
32. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 231 (1968).
33. See id. For additional discussion of the concept of retribution and the difficulty of
precisely defining it, see Hugo Adam Bedau, Retribution and the Theory of Punishment, 75 J.
PHIL. 601 (1978).
34. Jack Healy, Death Penalty is Sought in Shooting at Theater, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2013, at
A13.
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Retribution is clearly the most important justification for the
death penalty for the American public. In its 2014 survey, the Gal-
lup Organization found that “An eye for an eye” was by far the most
cited justification by death penalty proponents, with thirty-five per-
cent of death penalty supporters citing this rationale and fourteen
percent citing a closely related reason, “They deserve it.”35 Four per-
cent simply cited “justice,” and another four percent said that it was
a “fair punishment.”36 Gallup’s categories are poorly worded and
overlap, but the retributive attitudes of the respondents shine
through.
With the decline of other pro-death penalty arguments (i.e., re-
ligion, cost, incapacitation, and deterrence) in the 1980s and 1990s,
retribution slowly became the main justification for capital punish-
ment. At first, the retributive arguments were crude and bordered
on unadulterated hatred. Death row inmates were depicted as rabid
dogs, “often referred to as savages, beasts, subhuman, beyond re-
demption, animals.”37 In May 1990, I sat on my living room couch
with Kay Tafero as her son, Jesse, literally burned to death in Flor-
ida’s electric chair. No state official even acknowledged that the
method of death was regrettable, and no state official expressed any
regret or apology. As recently as 1997, Florida Attorney General
Bob Butterworth appeared to condone another botched execution
when Pedro Medina caught on fire in the electric chair, essentially
argued that the additional suffering added to the death penalty’s
deterrent value: “[p]eople who wish to commit murder [ ] better
not do it in the state of Florida because we may have a problem with
our electric chair.”38
Of course, it is virtually impossible to specify exactly what any
person “deserves,” whether it be reward or punishment.39 While the
Social Security Administration estimates the average annual salary
of American workers is roughly $45,000,40 the average salary of ma-
jor league baseball players in 2015 topped $4 million, and politician
35. Swift, supra note 13, at 1.
36. Id.
37. Colin Turnbull, Death by Decree, 87 NAT. HIST. 51, 51 (1978).
38. Condemned Man’s Mask Bursts Into Flame During Execution, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 1997),
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/03/26/us/condemned-man-s-mask-bursts-into-flame-during-
execution.html.
39. Although retribution theory includes an element of proportionality—the maximum
punishment for the maximum crimes—I have never been able to identify a discussion by
retributivists on what rules should be used to determine what the “maximum” should be. If
one murder might (under some circumstances) be used to justify execution, might the same
principles justify torture for those convicted of multiple murders?
40. The exact figure is $46,481.52. U.S. SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., National Average Wage
Index, OFFICIAL SOCIAL SECURITY WEBSITE, http://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/AWI.html (last vis-
ited Apr. 8, 2016).
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Donald Trump brags that his net worth is in excess of ten billion
dollars.41 Can one really justify these differences on the basis of
“dessert”? Baseball players work hard, but not necessarily any
harder than a single mother who works two low-salary jobs to sup-
port herself and her family. In the case of punishment, it is similarly
impossible to calculate precisely what a given offender “deserves,”
especially since so many inmates have mental health issues or back-
grounds of physical, mental, emotional, or sexual abuse.
Determining what someone “deserves” is ultimately not amenable
to precise calculation or measurement, and even if it were, there is
a very high risk of error in the measurement. We are not able to
precisely measure the intensity of criminal punishments, just like
we cannot measure with precision the harm that the inmate in-
flicted on the innocent victim when the capital crime was being
committed. There is no need to do either calculation. Pain is pain,
suffering is suffering, and precise measurement is ultimately impos-
sible and unnecessary. The goal should be for informed citizens
and their representatives to understand the punishments we im-
pose, acknowledge their severity, and recognize who that
punishment affects.
Even if we could determine what a given person “deserves,” that
does not obligate us to give or provide it. A boss may agree that her
workers “deserve” a raise, but that does not mean the workers will
get it. A group might agree that Osama bin Laden “deserves” to be
drawn and quartered, but the group would also agree that wise pub-
lic policy would not allow us to actually do it. Timothy McVeigh may
“deserve” to be executed, but that does not mean that we as a soci-
ety “deserve” to decide who shall or shall not die.  It most certainly
does not mean that giving McVeigh what he deserves, while not giv-
ing tens of millions of other Americans what they “deserve” in terms
of a just living wage, is where we should invest our resources.
As demonstrated, retributive justifications for the death penalty
can easily become ugly. Because of this crude nastiness, a relatively
new utilitarian justification for retribution has emerged in the past
twenty years to diminish the ugliness: we need executions not be-
cause of hatred or pure retribution, but instead to help families of
41. Ted Berg, The Average MLB Salary is over $4 Million and the Players Still Get $100 a Day
in Meal Money, USA TODAY: FOR THE WIN (Apr. 1, 2015, 1:06 PM), http://ftw.usatoday.com/
2015/04/major-league-baseball-average-salary-meal-money-2015-mlb; Gerry Mullany, Donald
Trump Claims His Wealth Exceeds ‘TEN BILLION DOLLARS’, N.Y. TIMES: FIRST DRAFT (July 15,
2015, 3:15 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/07/15/donald-trump-
says-hes-worth-more-than-10-billion/.
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homicide victims.42 This makes the retribution argument more po-
lite and easier to discuss in light chit-chat at cocktail parties.
Although death penalty debates have never totally ignored the fami-
lies of victims, newspaper accounts of capital trials and executions
before 1972 rarely gave these co-victims a voice. During the 1970s
and 1980s, however, there was a growing recognition that commu-
nities and the criminal justice system were not being responsive to
the needs of victims’ families.43 Prosecutors began to see themselves
as champions of victims’ rights and lawyers for the individual victim
rather than for the state, who strove to win death penalty cases as a
way to honor the deceased.44 As noted criminologist and legal
scholar Franklin Zimring remarked, the death penalty has been
symbolically transformed into a “victim-service program,” and its
supporters falsely depict opposition of it as opposing families of
homicide victims.45  According to Zimring, empirical studies of the
effects of the death penalty on the families of the victims are not
needed because it is a justification based not on data, but solely on
faith.46
Despite the prominence today of retributive justifications for the
death penalty, American society has rejected the idea that criminal
punishments should cause unnecessary or extreme physical pain.
Every death penalty abolitionist involved in death penalty debates
has been asked some variant of the question, “How would you feel if
someone close to you was murdered?”47 There are many ways to
respond to this question. For example, one might feel, albeit mo-
mentarily, that she would wish that the offender could be covered
with honey and eaten by ants, or perhaps slowly boiled to death.
Executions where the suspected offender was burned at the stake or
sawed in half are not difficult to find.48 But no serious proponent of
retributive justice today would call for such extreme punishments,
42. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 56–63
(2003).
43. By far the best collection of essays that examine the death penalty from the eyes of
families of homicide victims is WOUNDS THAT DO NOT BIND: VICTIM-BASED PERSPECTIVES ON
THE DEATH PENALTY (James R. Acker & David R. Karp eds., 2006).
44. ZIMRING, supra note 42, at 62–63.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 63.
47. The most memorable posing of this question came in the 1988 presidential race,
when, in the second debate between Michael Dukakis (a foe of the death penalty) and
George H.W. Bush, the former was asked, “Governor, if Kitty Dukakis [his wife] were raped
and murdered, would you favor an irrevocable death penalty for the killer?” JACK W.
GERMOND & JULES WITCOVER, WHOSE BROAD STRIPES AND BRIGHT STARS? THE TRIVIAL PURSUIT
OF THE PRESIDENCY 1988, 5 (1989).
48. See generally GEOFFREY ABBOTT, THE BOOK OF EXECUTION: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF METH-
ODS OF JUDICIAL EXECUTION 67, 326–27 (1995).
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even for mass murderers. When the theory of punishment is “he
deserves it,” the justification for such punishments’ acceptability
quickly becomes difficult to articulate. What does someone like Ted
Bundy “really” deserve?49
Similarly, while the death penalty has been increasingly justified
on retributive grounds, in the past two decades the United States
has moved away from several methods of execution (e.g., electrocu-
tion, hanging, shooting) over the past two decades because these
methods offend evolving standards of decency. Beginning with the
first use of lethal injection in 1982 and for the remainder of the
twentieth century, Americans saw a rapid movement away from the
electric chair, gas chamber, gallows, and firing squad as methods of
execution. Of the 478 executions that occurred in the 11 years be-
tween January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2015, only six were by
electrocution, one by firing squad, and none by asphyxiation (cya-
nide gas) or hanging.50 Lethal injection thus accounts for 98.5% of
the executions in the U.S. in the recent past.51 This is because most
observers see lethal injection as relatively painless, similar to being
put to sleep before a surgical procedure. The contrast between
wanting the inmate to suffer, but with “humane” execution meth-
ods, is a major contradiction: if the goal of the death penalty is to
make the offender suffer, should we really care if he catches on fire
in the electric chair or slowly suffocates while dangling on the
gallows?
II. RETRIBUTION AND LWOP SENTENCES
In all of the thirty-one states that authorized the imposition of
new death sentences in December 2015, any inmate convicted of a
capital crime who is not sentenced to death will still die in prison.
The alternative to the death penalty is LWOP.52 Once the inmate
sentenced to LWOP has exhausted his judicial appeals, the only
49. Bundy was convicted of three murders in Florida and confessed to committing 30
others in the 1970s (in seven states) before his death in Florida’s electric chair in 1989. For
more information, see for example, STEPHEN G. MICHAUD & HUGO AYNESWORTH, TED BUNDY:
CONVERSATIONS WITH A KILLER (1989). I worked with Bundy for the last ten years of his life,
went through last visits with him, kept his ashes in my closet for several months after his
execution, and hosted his parents while they visited him in prison. I found his parents to be
wonderful people and totally undeserving of the misery that the death penalty inflicted on
their family.
50. These tallies were calculated from Searchable Execution Database, DEATH PENALTY INFO.
CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/views-executions (last visited on Apr. 8, 2016).
51. Id.
52. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LIFE GOES ON: THE HISTORIC RISE IN LIFE SENTENCES IN
AMERICA 1–7 (2013), http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Life%20Goes%20
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exit from prison is through the slim chance of some sort of execu-
tive clemency or previously unanticipated exoneration.
Even though many people outside of prison may not realize it,53
the vast majority of prisoners who receive LWOP sentences lead
miserable lives.54 In general, the younger the prisoner, the longer
he can expect to serve in prison with an LWOP sentence, and the
retributive impact of a sentence usually increases with its length.
Longer sentences are usually more retributive and more painful be-
cause the punishment is administered for a longer period of time.
The median age of those admitted to death row in the United
States in 2013 was thirty-eight years.55 In 2011, the life expectancy of
a thirty-nine year old male in the United States was an additional
39.4 years.56 In other words, the average LWOP sentence is roughly
forty years, but this grows by nearly a year for each year under age
forty the inmate is at the time of initial sentence. Consequently,
LWOP sentences are usually more retributive for a twenty-year-old
defendant newly admitted to prison than for an eighty-year-old,
since the former can expect to live many more years of misery in
prison than the latter.
While death row inmates and their families have some reason to
hope for positive news in their cases right up to the day of execu-
tion—judicial relief or even a sentence reduction to LWOP
through executive clemency—those serving LWOP sentences rec-
ognize that, at least in today’s political climate, they have little
On%202013.pdf. In 2012, there were approximately 160,000 prisoners in American jurisdic-
tions serving life terms. Id. at 1.
53. Those who believe that LWOP is not a harsh sentence are simply misinformed. At a
talk that I presented to a Denver Rotary Club in June 2015, one well-intentioned person in
the audience insisted that prisoners, regardless of sentence, had easy access to drugs, sexual
relationships with non-prisoners, and excellent food and medical care.
54. For an excellent discussion of the miseries experienced by those who are serving
LWOP sentences, see generally Robert Johnson & Sandra McGunigall Smith, Life Without
Parole, America’s Other Death Penalty, 88 THE PRISON J. 328 (2008), which argues that the suffer-
ing experienced by those sentenced to “death by incarceration . . . can be equally as painful
as the death penalty, albeit in different ways.” Id. at 328, 332–36.
55. TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CAPITAL PUN-
ISHMENT, 2013—STATISTICAL TABLES 10 (revised Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/cp13st.pdf.
56. U.S. SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., Actuarial Life Table, OFFICIAL SOCIAL SECURITY WEBSITE,
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table4c6.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2016). These life expec-
tancies have wide variation, so that a twenty-year-old male can expect to live fifty-seven
additional years, and a sixty-five-year-old male can expect to live 17.7 years. These life expec-
tancies are generous, since the typical prisoner has a lower life expectancy than non-
prisoners. “It is generally accepted that life in prison, with its stressors, violence and disease
in and of itself significantly shortens one’s life expectancy.” THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR
SENTENCING OF YOUTH, MICHIGAN LIFE EXPECTANCY DATA FOR YOUTH SERVING NATURAL LIFE
SENTENCES 1 (2010), http://fairsentencingofyouth.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/Michi
gan-Life-Expectancy-Data-Youth-Serving-Life.pdf (citations omitted).
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reason for hope that their current sentences will be changed.57
LWOP sentences can also be seen as “LWOH” sentences: “life with-
out hope.” In my experience, unlike most death row inmates, very
few inmates serving LWOP sentences have  attorneys. Even if they
did have these resources, few prisoners serving LWOP or even life
sentences with parole eligibility ever get out today, absent compel-
ling evidence of innocence, even if the prisoner is on his or her
death bed.58
III. RETRIBUTION AND DEATH SENTENCES: DEATH IS DIFFERENT
In the words of former Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart,
“death is a punishment different from all other sanctions in kind
rather than degree,”59 and “the penalty of death is different in kind
from any other punishment imposed under our system of criminal
justice.”60 In this Part, I discuss the retributive impact of the death
penalty versus the retributive impact of LWOP, and differentiate
the added retributive impacts of the death penalty the inmate feels
versus those his family feels. My intent is not to provide a complete
laundry list of what the inmate and his family experience by the
added retributive power of the death penalty, but instead to simply
provide some examples.61 Given the diversity of death row inmates
and their families, these impacts will vary in their intensity, dura-
tion, and the number of people they touch.
Whatever can be said about the miseries experienced by the life-
sentenced inmate and his family, a death sentence significantly
adds to the retributive power of the criminal sanction. In fact, that
is precisely its goal. In my observation, for supporters of the death
penalty, an LWOP sentence, while causing a lifetime of misery, is
simply not punitive enough to satisfy the goals of an amorphous
definition of “justice.”
57. Catherine Appleton & Brent Grøver, The Pros and Cons of Life Without Parole, 47 BRIT.
J. CRIMINOLOGY 597, 609–11 (2007).
58. For example, Susan Atkins, one of the so-called followers of Charles Manson, died in
September 2009, just three weeks after being wheeled into a meeting with the parole board
on her death bed.  Despite her excellent behavior in prison, the parole board unanimously
requested her request for release.  When she died she was the longest serving woman in
California prisons.  Elaine Woo, Susan Atkins Dies at 61; Imprisoned Charles Manson Follower,
L.A. TIMES, (Sept. 26, 2009) http://www.latimes.com/local/obituaries/la-me-susan-atkins26-
2009sep26-story.html.
59. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303–04 (1976).
60. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976).
61. For elaboration, see Margaret Vandiver, The Impact of the Death Penalty on the Families
of Homicide Victims and of Condemned Prisoners, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT, supra note 9.
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Some supporters of the death penalty would reject any concern
for the families of the inmate by taking the position that the suffer-
ing experienced by the family is caused solely by the inmate and his
criminality. Such an attitude misses the point: the citizens and their
elected officials make the decision to sentence someone to death.
No state is obligated to execute people.62 There is clearly a need to
acknowledge that the pain the death penalty inflicts is an option
chosen by the state, and citizens need to take responsibility for it.
Given the inevitability of eventual death in prison, either at the
hands of the state or by other means, it is not uncommon for death
row inmates to forfeit their appeals, dismiss their attorneys, and ask
to be executed. Between January 1977 and December 31, 2015,
there were 1422 executions in the U.S., and 143 of these inmates
(ten percent) are classified as “volunteers” because they gave up
their appeals.63 Countless other death row inmates have, at one
time or another, considered dropping their appeals, only to change
their minds; family, ministers, attorneys, and fellow inmates often
convince them not to drop these appeals. Some family members go
so far as to file “next of kin” motions in the courts to stop consen-
sual executions. I have never met any relative of a death row inmate
who would prefer that his relative be executed rather than live a life
in prison.64 This is a sobering point: not only do a significant num-
ber of prisoners on death row prefer death to LWOP, but ten
percent of those executed have the stamina to resist pleas from
others in their close social circles to avoid going through with it.
Prior to trial, a significant number—perhaps half—of death row
inmates today were either offered a plea deal that would have
spared them from the death penalty, or could have been offered a
plea deal had they instructed or permitted their trial attorney to
pursue one with prosecutors.65 In the vast majority of these situa-
tions, the deal would have resulted in a sentence of LWOP; the
severity of this sentence leads many defendants in such situations to
62. In fact, by the end of 2014 there were 140 countries from around the world that had
abolished the death penalty in law or in practice. Just 58 countries remain today that actively
employ executioners. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, DEATH SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS 2014
64–65 (2015), http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/DeathSentencesAndExecutions2014_EN.
pdf.
63. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, supra note 50.
64. No doubt there are examples of relatives who want the inmate executed, particularly
in cases of inter-familial murders. However, the pro-death penalty family members do not
visit the prison, so in my own prison visits I have interacted with a “biased sample” of relatives.
65. Since 1979, following all new death sentences in Florida, I have sent the defense
attorney a questionnaire and obtained from him or her a copy of the judge’s “sentencing
order” in which the judge specifies the formal findings of aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances. I now have over 1100 responses in my files. My estimate of “half” derives from the
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decide to gamble and risk a death sentence at trial, with the hope
that they will receive an outcome that would permit the possibility
of ultimate freedom.
LWOP is a horrible sentence that not only punishes the inmate,
but removes any possibility of hope for redemption, much less hope
for freedom. Nonetheless, in my experience, even life in prison of-
fers some very real opportunities for growth and fulfillment. When
they anticipate execution, all inmates invariably think at times of
the small pleasures they will miss, even if they know they will still die
in prison. While these vary with the individual, common positive
experiences of prison—even for those serving LWOP—include in-
teractions with family and other loved ones (perhaps even with
friends who are also in prison), the Sunday football game, a good
book, an adequate meal, perhaps the peace of finding redemption
and forgiveness from self and others.
On the other hand, in most of the last visits I have gone through,
perhaps ninety percent of the inmates say something to the effect
of “Thank God that I am getting out of here.” Again, this does not
mean that he welcomes execution, but it does show some silver lin-
ing in the cloud. Of course, in some cases the inmate undoubtedly
says this to convince himself that it is true, or says it as one way of
trying to comfort his grieving family.
When facing a death sentence and the gradual realization that
successful appeals are impossible, the inmate’s family is usually sit-
ting on a roller coaster of emotions alongside the inmate,
experiencing similar fears, uncertainties, and disappointments as
their loved one.66 Additionally, “[m]any family members experi-
ence an almost unbearable sense of helplessness or powerlessness
to do anything about the sentence or the impending execution.”67
One need only reflect a bit on how he or she would react if a family
member were arrested, even for the most horrific crimes possible.
There are exceptions, but for most families I have worked with, fac-
ing the death penalty for a loved one, family is family and love for
family members is unconditional. Based on what I have learned
from my visits with death row inmates and their families in the years
attorneys’ responses to my question about whether a plea bargain was offered by the prosecu-
tor. My estimate is purposely imprecise because there are many cases in which the defendant
instructed the attorney not to vigorously seek a prison sentence as part of a plea bargain.
66. See generally Rachel King, How the Death Penalty Violates the Constitutional Rights of the
Family Members of Death Row Inmates,16 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J. 195 (2007).
67. BOHM, supra note 8, at 110.
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and months and hours before the execution, in many cases the fam-
ily hurts and agonizes and suffers just as much as the inmate.68
Within an inmate’s family, the retributive impact of the death
penalty generally falls more heavily on women (mothers, wives, and
girlfriends) and children than on adult males. I have rarely seen
biological fathers or stepfathers among death row visitors. As two
colleagues and I wrote over thirty years ago, “[t]he visitors to death
row are a diverse group. Few fathers visit, although it is unknown if
this fact reflects an absence of fathers prior to incarceration or a
lower willingness or ability for fathers to visit. Mothers are the most
frequent visitors . . . .”69
Children have been called the death penalty’s “hidden victims,”
and several commentators have called the impact of having their
parents executed “the death penalty’s dirty little secret.”70 In the
words of three researchers who have studied the families of death
row inmates, “[t]he death penalty is designed to punish offenders
who commit heinous crimes, but the reality is that much of the bur-
den of this punishment is shouldered by the offender’s children or
siblings and the actual execution may increase the likelihood of
negative outcomes in their lives.”71
In one sense, the families of death row inmates are not diverse: in
my experience they are all impoverished. Those who had savings
typically depleted them during the trial, occasionally retaining pri-
vate attorneys who took every cent they could get and stopped
working on the case when the money was gone. Few have college
degrees, and since 57.2 percent of death row inmates today are ra-
cial or ethnic minorities,72 it follows that their families, too, are
disproportionately minorities.
Like patients struggling with a terminal illness, the death row in-
mate can anticipate and even fear his death, and in this journey he
is usually accompanied by family members who struggle with the
same emotions. However, after his execution and unlike the family,
68. I hasten to add that I know little about families (or individual family members) who
have abandoned the inmate and have little or nothing to do with him in his years on death
row (and often in the years preceding the crime).
69. Michael L. Radelet et al., Families, Prisons, and Men with Death Sentences: The Human
Impact of Structured Uncertainty, 4 J. OF FAM. ISSUES 593, 603 (1983).
70. See generally SUSAN F. SHARP, HIDDEN VICTIMS: THE EFFECTS OF THE DEATH PENALTY ON
FAMILIES OF THE ACCUSED (2005); ELIZABETH BECK ET AL., IN THE SHADOW OF DEATH: RESTORA-
TIVE JUSTICE AND DEATH ROW FAMILIES 112 (2007).
71. BECK ET AL., supra note 70, at 112.
72. FINS, supra note 7, at 1 (noting that 42.77 percent of those sentenced to death in the
U.S. as of April 1, 2015 were white).
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the inmate cannot reflect on it. All his agony ends when the execu-
tioner does his work, but as will be discussed in the next Part, the
family continues to ache.
IV. WHO SUFFERS AFTER THE EXECUTION?
Once the inmate is executed, he is dead. Whatever the retribu-
tive impact of imprisonment and execution is on the inmate, it is
over. The inmate’s family, however, continues to suffer. All of us
can think about our inevitable deaths, but we can never reflect back
on them. Our survivors will and do, and in cases where the death is
as traumatic and stigmatized as state executions, living with the af-
termath quite often brings special miseries that differ both
qualitatively and quantitatively from those experienced by family
members of those serving LWOP sentences.
The impact of the execution on the inmate’s family can go on
and on for many years, even until the family members’ own
deaths.73 While families vary in size and in their relationships with
the now-deceased prisoner, below are three examples I have ob-
served of how their pain and suffering can often go on after the
inmate has died:
1. Guilt. It is not uncommon for families to second-guess their
own past decisions and behavior that may have contributed to the
loved one’s criminality. Again and again, the life-histories of death
row inmates show histories of childhood abuse: mental, physical,
emotional, or sexual.74 Family members may regret their role in
this, or regret that they did not intervene to stop other family mem-
bers or friends from inflicting the damage. Family members may
also regret that they did not more aggressively seek mental health
counseling for their loved one when the first signs of abnormalities
began to surface.
Family members may also regret decisions that they made after
the loved one’s arrest. Could they have done more to help the
loved one negotiate a plea bargain that would have avoided the
death sentence? Were they fully cooperative with attorneys and in-
vestigators? If they testified at the penalty phase of the trial, could
73. I knew several mothers and wives of executed inmates at the time of their deaths and
the pain lasted their whole lives.
74. See Mark D. Cunningham & Mark P. Vigen, Death Row Inmate Characteristics, Adjust-
ment, and Confinement: A Critical Review of the Literature, 20 BEHAV. SCI. AND THE L. 191 (2002);
David Lisak & Sara Beszterczey, The Cycle of Violence: The Life Histories of 43 Death Row Inmates, 8
PSYCHOL. OF MEN & MASCULINITY 118 (2007).
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they have done a better job convincing the jury to spare their loved
one’s life?
2. Anger. It is not uncommon for family members to continue to
be angry with their loved one and the criminal justice system after
his execution. Anger, justified or not, is often very painful for those
who are angry and must learn to deal with it. There may be linger-
ing anger at the executed loved one: “How could he have
committed this crime and caused such damage to our family?” Or
they may feel angry with other family members: “How could his bio-
logical father have treated him (and us) so badly?”
Family members may also direct anger at others involved in the
crime or trial. Family members may feel another person was the
true culprit or the more responsible party, or blame another person
for getting their loved one involved with the crime. They may feel
the criminal homicide was an accident, done in self-defense or be-
cause of mental illness; they may think it was not a capital offense
but instead a manslaughter or second-degree murder. They may
have continued anger at witnesses, the trial judge, and prosecutors
for painting what they feel is a distorted picture of the crime and
their loved one’s role in it. They may feel continued anger toward
the family of the victims for so actively calling for the death penalty
and celebrating its imposition, affirmance in the courts, the denial
of clemency, and the ultimate execution. They may believe that one
or more defense attorneys did a lousy job. The executed inmate
does not know about any crowds outside the prison or persons
quoted in newspapers who celebrate his death, but his family mem-
bers do. I have yet to meet any death row inmate or any of his
family members who feel that the inmate had a fair trial with com-
petent defense and an ethical prosecutor and judge.
3. Isolation, Shame, and Stigma. Inmates usually face their impend-
ing executions with social supports not available to the family: his
fellow inmates, a spiritual advisor, and his legal team. The inmate
often has a better understanding than their family members of the
complexity of the litigation and case law that limit his options in
appellate courts.
Family members, however, tend to be more isolated. They “con-
tinue to be nearly invisible. No politicians mention their names in
their campaigns, very few advocacy groups are concerned with their
needs, and there is little public recognition or concern for their
situation.”75 The shame they may feel about their loved one’s crime
may lead them to not even tell neighbors and coworkers what they
are going through (impossible if they live in the community where
75. See Vandiver, supra note 61, at 628.
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the crime occurred; very possible if the family member has a differ-
ent surname or lives out of state). Even friends who know about the
crime and the death sentence may drift away, or not know what to
say and therefore say nothing.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Criminal punishments are supposed to be directed at the guilty,
not the innocent. Invariably, all criminal punishments affect inno-
cent parties, such as when a father is sentenced to a prison term
and thereby deprives his child of the love, mentorship and financial
support he might otherwise provide. But “death is different.”76 No
other criminal punishment can compare with the severity of its re-
tributive effects. As Camus wrote, relatives of death row inmates
“experience a misery that punishes them far beyond the bounds of
all justice.”77
The observations in this Article lead to six main conclusions:
1. The primary justification for seeking and imposing a death
sentence, as opposed to LWOP, is to increase the prisoner’s suffer-
ing (retribution).78 The goal is to make the prisoner suffer for the
sake of suffering, rather than to achieve any other end.79
2. In general, a principle of proportionality governs criminal
punishments, with maximum punishments reserved for those who
knowingly commit the worst crimes. That principle, however, does
not tell us what the maximum punishment should be, although in
my experience there is widespread agreement that retributive pun-
ishments should have limits and not involve torture. To say that
“justice” demands a death sentence does not tell us what “justice” is
or what the limits to just punishment should be.
3. To be justifiable, the retributive power of a punishment
should affect only the guilty, and not the innocent.80
4. When the state seeks, imposes, or carries out a death sen-
tence, virtually all friends and foes of the death penalty who I have
met all acknowledge that the inmate’s family often suffers, to vary-
ing degrees.  But many do not appreciate or acknowledge that the
family can often suffer as much or more than the prisoner himself,
76. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 322 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 188 (1976).
77. ALBERT CAMUS, REFLECTIONS ON THE GUILLOTINE 30 (Richard Howard trans.,
Fridtjof-Karla Publications 1959) (1957).
78. See supra Part I.
79. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
80. See Hart, supra note 32, at 231.
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and that this suffering disproportionately affects women and chil-
dren. A crucial difference between the inmate and his family is that
the family is not being punished in the aftermath of a conviction
for the violation of criminal law. We usually think about erroneous
convictions when we think about how the death penalty can punish
the innocent. The suffering of the inmate’s family is another exam-
ple of how the criminal justice system punishes people despite their
innocence. The executioner certainly and inevitably catches the
guilty with his net, but he also catches innocent bystanders.
The inmate’s family often suffers just as much as the inmate him-
self when dealing with retributive impacts of the death penalty. As
the execution approaches, the inmate and family will do anything
they can do to try to stop it, but the inmate has limited options and
the family may very well feel that they cannot leave any stone un-
turned and become more frantic with their efforts to stop the
process. Both the inmate and his family may feel helpless. But just
like in situations that many families experience when facing an im-
pending death from natural causes, the inmate or patient and his
or her family are in the struggle together. In my work with death
row inmates and their families over the past thirty-five years, I have
come to believe that the retributive impact of the death penalty is
often felt just as much by the family as it is by the inmate. The full
brunt of the retributive impact falls on the family after the execu-
tion, and the pain, stigma, and anger can last a lifetime. As with the
families of homicide victims, life is never quite the same.
5. Even when a prisoner “deserves” to be punished, it is impossi-
ble to precisely calculate how much punishment anyone “deserves”
for any behavior; such calculations are necessarily filled with error.
And just because someone deserves something does not mean we
are obligated to give it.
6. The decision to sentence someone to death is a decision made
by citizens and their elected representatives, and no state is obli-
gated to impose a death sentence. As a society, we need to
acknowledge that the decision to impose the death penalty and the
suffering for the sake of suffering it brings to the inmate and his
family is an option chosen by the state; we need to take responsibil-
ity for the harm it causes to secondary victims, whether intended or
not it.
* * * * *
In my experiences working with death row inmates and their
families, the added retributive power of a death sentence over and
above LWOP usually impacts his family, and other innocent people
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with whom the inmate interacts, as much as or more than, it im-
pacts the inmate himself. Unlike the inmate, most family members
and others in the inmate’s social circle have not been convicted of
any criminal offense, and certainly not for the capital offense for
which the inmate is being punished. The death penalty operates
more like a shotgun—affecting many targets—than a rifle, which
has an impact on only one target. It creates an “ever widening circle
of tragedy.”81
The above conclusions support several reforms in death penalty
law and procedures. The collateral damage that the death penalty
does to the defendant’s family during their loved one’s trial, con-
finement, and execution is a significant liability of capital
punishment, and therefore should be included in any comprehen-
sive cost-benefit assessment of it. Some observers, for example, may
see the harm done to families of the offender as counterbalancing
any alleged benefits that the death penalty might provide for the
family of the victim.
Alternatively, recognition of what the family of defendants and
inmates facing the death penalty go through may lead some fund-
ing sources to expand the services of “victim advocates” so they can
assist not only the victim’s family, but the family of the offender as
well. Prisons might also consider expanding the assistance they pro-
vide to the families of inmates, especially death row inmates, which
today are seldom and inconsistently available (often only through
the prison chaplain). Finally, we should think about whether the
alleged benefits of the death penalty are really worth the pain that
the punishment inflicts on the family members who are inevitably
impacted both by the many years that their loved one struggles on
death row, and their lifelong memories of those struggles, which
stretch on after their loved one is executed.
81. Turnbull, supra note 37, at 54.
